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Although climate policies have been so far mostly 
focused on mitigation, adaptation to climate change is a 
growing concern in developed and developing countries. 
This paper discusses how adaptation fits into the global 
climate strategy, at the global and national levels. To do 
so, a partial equilibrium optimization model of climate 
policies—which includes mitigation, proactive adaptation 
(ex ante), and reactive adaptation (ex post)—is solved 
without and with uncertainty. Mitigation, proactive 
adaptation, and reactive adaptation are found to be 
generally jointly determined. Uncertainty on the location 
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of damages reduces the benefits of “targeted” proactive 
adaptation with regard to mitigation and reactive 
adaptation. However, no single country controls global 
mitigation policies, and budget constraints might make 
it difficult for developing countries to finance reactive 
adaptation, especially if climate shocks affect the fiscal 
base. Rainy-day funds are identified as a supplemental 
instrument that can alleviate future budget constraints 
while avoiding the risk of misallocating resources when 
the location of damages is uncertain.  
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1.  Introduction 
Climate policies have been so far mostly focused on mitigation. But adaptation—long a concern 
of developing countries—is slowly getting more attention worldwide. This is in part due to 
growing recognition that the climate is already changing in some areas of the globe,1 and that—
regardless of the success or failure of mitigation policies—further changes will occur, thus 
making some degree of adaptation inevitable in both developed and developing countries. 
The new emphasis on adaptation, however, also raises difficult questions: How does 
adaptation differ from regular development expenditures and what should be funded by resources 
dedicated to adaptation? What is the role of the public sector (globally, nationally, and locally) in 
supporting adaptation? Given that funds also need to be set aside for mitigation, how should 
resources be balanced between mitigation and adaptation (globally and nationally)? Of the funds 
set aside for adaptation, what is the best allocation between ex ante and ex post expenditures 
(globally and nationally)? Since the damages of climate change are likely to be sector- and/or 
region-specific, how does one allocate resources in the presence of uncertainties and budget 
constraints (locally, nationally, and globally)?  
The present paper aims to address these questions in a partial equilibrium framework. 
Section 2 briefly outlines developing country and international concerns about the link between 
adaptation and development; and describes a few important characteristics that differentiate the 
adaptation problem from the mitigation problem, as well as, various rationales for public support 
for adaptation, within and across countries. Section 3 discusses the relationship between 
mitigation, ex ante adaptation, and ex post adaptation in a model without uncertainty and without 
budget constraints. Section 4 discusses how uncertainty affects the balance between mitigation 
and adaptation, as well as between proactive and reactive adaptation options. And Section 5 
discusses how budget constraints modify the results. Section 6 pulls together key points and 
concludes. 
                                                 
1 There is consensus on the fact that global warming is occurring and that some degree of adaptation is necessary—
even though there is still some discussion about how much of the observed warming is due to anthropogenic causes, 
and how much of it should be mitigated through collective action. 
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2.  Adaptation and development 
2.1.  Development strategies have to be re-assessed in light of the climate risk 
Development involves moving from a low physical, human and institutional asset base to a high 
asset base within a set of constraints including, inter alia, geography, endowments in natural 
resources, climate, history, regional and global economic environment, etc. From a developing 
country perspective, climate change is a new constraint within which development takes place. 
How this new constraint might modify allocation of resources in development strategies requires 
disposing of two concerns. 
First, climate change impacts on development strategies can no longer be discarded on the 
ground that damages of climate change are too uncertain or too far off in the future. In fact, the 
IPCC (Alley et al., 2007) projects an increase in temperature of 0.2 degrees Celsius per decade 
independent of the emissions scenario over the next three decades. It also projects a very likely 
increase in the frequency of heat waves, hot extremes, and extreme weather events over the same 
time frame—following observed increases over the past decades. There is already an emerging 
consensus that climate change will generate additional tensions on freshwater availability in the 
coming decades in areas where water availability is already an issue.  
Second, the fact that adaptation to current climate variability is already part of a country’s 
development strategy does not mean that the strategy is also adapted to climate change. This 
point is important because a lot of the literature on adaptation emphasizes so-called ‘win-win’ 
opportunities in which improving adaptation to current climate variability is aligned with 
adaptation to future climate change.  
For example, a key development goal for a small, very poor country with a high share of GDP 
in climate-sensitive agriculture might be to improve smallholders’ agricultural productivity and 
their integration into agro-processing. A necessary condition for this purpose is to reduce the high 
vulnerability of smallholders to historic weather-related shocks. This requires implementing 
projects such as irrigation, micro-level weather insurance, improved management of key 
watersheds, or agriculture development programs including weather risk mitigation. If these 
measures are adopted, it would seem at first glance, that the current development strategy already 
goes in the right direction with regard to climate change, since it targets vulnerable rural 
communities with the objective of reducing the impacts of weather-related risks. However, these 
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projects and programs may not be sufficient to cope with increased variability in climate, or with 
sustained patterns in climate for which there is no precedent—for example hundred year floods 
occurring every decade, etc.
2  
In general, climate change will require that most development expenditures that are climate 
sensitive—such as, inter alia, investments in almost all types of infrastructure (transportation, 
telecom, utilities, etc.), housing programs, agriculture development policies, policies regarding 
tourism, etc.—be upgraded and designed to withstand higher tolerances/peak loads or that the 
development strategy shifts to sectors that are less climate sensitive.  
At a minimum, it is therefore necessary that countries review their development strategies, 
their policies and their projects in light of the emerging risk of climate change. Such a review 
should be conducted for all investment projects that take place within the country, be they funded 
by corporations, communities, households, or individuals—not only for investment programs and 
projects funded by the government. 
Similarly, the design of long-lasting institutional arrangements may have to be revised to take 
climate change into account. For example, when water runoffs are expected to diminish, it is all 
the more important for long-term water rights arrangements to include strong provisions for 
resolving tensions.  
To the extent that the benefits of adaptation are local, adaptation should be financed locally 
whether in developed or in developing countries. However, the population exposed to climate 
change damages is likely to be larger in developing countries, where damages are likely to be 
more important and where ability to pay is lower. Hence the need for some transfer/international 
financing mechanism from developed to developing countries. In some cases, however, the 
benefits of adaptation are regional or even global, and should be financed accordingly.  
Adaptation is already a key issue in the upcoming discussions on the second commitment 
period and the post-Kyoto international climate regime, in part because most Parties to the 
UNFCCC have comparatively low emissions, and adaptation, much more than mitigation, is the 
critical challenge they face in developing policies to address climate change. 
                                                 
2 The problem can be compounded by the loss of local knowledge and capacity to cope/adapt–whether due to AIDS 
and premature deaths of knowledgeable adults (particularly in rural areas) (e.g., Suarez et al., 2007) or due to rural 
outmigration associated with the modernization and urbanization of the economy.  
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2.2.  How does adaptation differ from mitigation? 
Scientists have established a causal chain between anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs), to increases in concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere, to changes in global 
temperature, to changes in sea level and other manifestations of climate change, to economic 
impacts of those changes and implications for welfare. 
Mitigation consists of reducing emissions (or removing GHGs out of the atmosphere) at the 
beginning of the chain to avoid or minimize climate change in the first place, whereas adaptation 
consists of responding to the anticipated or actual economic damages of climate change at the 
end of the chain. 
This section outlines three additional important characteristics that differentiate adaptation 
from mitigation and that complicate the analysis in setting up priorities: the large uncertainty on 
the benefits of adaptation; the lack of a common performance indicator; and the need to 
differentiate between proactive and reactive adaptation. 
The uncertainty on the benefits of adaptation is usually larger than the uncertainty on the 
benefits of mitigation 
In economic terms, the benefits of mitigation (or social value of carbon) are defined as the 
discounted sum of the (future) damages avoided by reducing emissions (now). However, the 
social value of carbon remains controversial (see e.g., Stern 2007 for a discussion) because of  (i) 
remaining uncertainties on the causal chain between emissions and impacts, and on the 
implications of these changes for natural systems, biological systems and societies (Adger et al., 
2007); (ii) uncertainties on large-scale non-linearities, such as thermohaline circulation slowdown 
or West Antarctic Ice Sheet collapse; (iii) uncertainties on business-as-usual emissions in the next 
century, and thus on how much damages would occur in the absence of climate mitigation; and  
(iv) methodological and policy differences over the treatment of small probability/large impact 
risks and the value of the discount rate. 
Similarly, the economic benefits of adaptation can be defined as the discounted sum of the 
damages avoided by the adaptation measure considered relative to what would have happened in 
the absence of this measure. The key difference is that adaptation measures usually reduce 
damages in a single sector, a single region, or a single sector/activity within a specific region. As 
a result, both the counter-factual against which the benefits of adaptation are estimated and the 
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direct effects of the adaptation measure on damages have to be estimated at the local level. But 
the existence of impacts, the sign of these impacts, their magnitude, their time horizon, and their 
frequency are all uncertain at the local level. As the IPCC notes, uncertainties are much larger at 
the local/sectoral level than at the global level. 
Unlike mitigation, there is no Common Performance Indicator for adaptation 
Mitigation encompasses a wide range of activities, from fuel-switching to sequestration of carbon 
in biomass. Yet there is a unique metric for measuring the performance of mitigation measures, 
namely the amount of emissions reduction they generate.  
Adaptation also encompasses a wide range of activities in all sectors. And for each class of 
activity, it is possible to define performance indicators, e.g., the maximum wind-speed a 
construction can withstand, or the water stress tolerance of new varieties of plants. But there is, to 
our knowledge, no common metric to compare performance across classes of adaptation 
activities.
3
A policy implication of the absence of a common metric is that resources devoted to 
adaptation will probably be more difficult to allocate via global market mechanisms than 
resources devoted to mitigation.  
As a result, resources devoted to adaptation both at the national level and at the international 
level are more likely to be allocated via policy processes. This is by no means a unique feature of 
adaptation—in fact, only a small share of public resources devoted to mitigation is currently 
allocated via markets.
4  But it does raise the question of ensuring the efficient allocation of 
resources devoted to adaptation 
                                                 
3 It is possible in principle to compare the performance of adaptation measures by evaluating their ‘net benefits in 
terms of avoided damages’. This solution is not practical yet in the current state of knowledge about damages and 
adaptation measures. The benefits of adaptation activities are often highly uncertain and thus very difficult to 
estimates reliably ex ante. Evaluating avoided damages relative to normal patterns/baselines ex post is, conceptually 
at least, relatively easy for single extreme weather events—for example, by comparing areas where adaptation 
measures were implemented with areas where they were not, or by analyzing historic records of damages associated 
with comparable climate events. However, ex post evaluation becomes more difficult for gradual changes in climate, 
especially if these changes do not have historical precedents locally. 
4 For example, Capoor and Ambrosi (2007) estimate that market mechanisms will account for 20% to 35% of total 
mitigation effort by developed countries under the Kyoto Protocol. 
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The distinction between proactive or anticipative adaptation ex ante and reactive 
adaptation or coping ex post 
It is important to distinguish between two forms of adaptation, as proposed in the Third 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (McCarthy et al., 2001). 
Anticipative adaptation (or proactive adaptation) focuses on lowering the costs of coping ex ante. 
Coping
5 (or reactive adaptation), focuses on coping with the adverse impacts of climate change 
ex-post. 
As noted by Fankhauser et al. (1998), the distinction between anticipative and reactive 
adaptation is intuitively clear, but difficult to delineate with precision in a dynamic setting. For 
example, after the heat wave of August 2003, which is estimated to have caused in excess of 
11,000 deaths over historical averages, the French government prepared a “Heat Wave National 
Action Plan” that includes inter alia the creation of a national alert system, a strong effort for 
prevention and information, and a clearer division of tasks among public agencies (latest version, 
République Française, 2006). Clearly, this plan was adopted in reaction to the 2003 heat wave 
(reactive adaptation ex post). But it has been adopted in anticipation of repeat events (proactive 
adaptation ex ante). Interestingly, the plan explicitly mentions climate change as a rationale.  
However, the distinction between anticipative and reactive adaptation is important from a 
policy point of view because the rationale for the two actions are very different. Prevention uses 
resources now to prevent possible crisis in the future, while reactive adaptation uses resources to 
cope with events at the time they occur.
6 The crux of the problem is that, in practice, behavioral 
changes and policy decisions are often easier to implement once a crisis has occurred than in 
anticipation of a crisis. But from an economic point of view, the often lower costs of preventive 
action (anticipative adaptation)
7 are likely to dominate the higher costs of deferred action 
                                                 
5 Coping can be defined as a combination of survival expenditures and rebuilding/restoration expenditures.   
However, coping may not be sufficient to fully restore the status quo ante because of irreversibilities – i.e., losses 
that are technically impossible to restore (such as sceneries, irreversible biodiversity losses or disappearance of 
unique cultural artifacts) or economically too costly to restore. These losses can be referred to as “remaining ultimate 
damages”.  The full climate bill will thus consist of four components: mitigation, proactive adaptation, reactive 
adaptation and ultimate damages (see discussion of model in section 3). 
6 Creating or reinforcing in advance a coping mechanism, such as a setting up and training emergency response 
teams is anticipative adaptation, whereas using these units to reduce damages when they occur is reactive adaptation. 
7 Reactive adaptation encompasses measures under taken at the time climate change occurs that alleviate the 
ultimate damages (e.g., moving people out of harm’s way after the fact, rebuilding structures, etc.) however, lump 
sum transfers of resources to victims of climate change are not included in reactive adaptation because as transfers 
they do not affect this size or efficiency of the economy. 
  7 
(reactive adaptation) appropriately discounted, thereby making anticipative adaptation the 
priority for action today.  
There is another difference between mitigation and adaptation which is picked up in the next 
subsection—namely the difference in the extent to which the two types of interventions generate 
public goods and the justification for public action.  
2.3.  Is there a public sector role in adaptation?  
Adaptation provides Mostly Private or Local Public Benefits 
Mitigation reduces all climate-related risks—both known and unknown—everywhere. 
Adaptation, on the other hand, reduces specific classes of risks, often in specific areas or types of 
locations. Thus, adaptation can be site-specific (land-use planning), risk-specific (R&D on heat-
tolerant crops), or both (hardening of infrastructure). 
In other words, mitigation provides a clear global public good requiring international 
collective action, whereas adaptation mostly provides a private good (e.g., a more resistant 
building benefiting its inhabitants only), a club good (e.g., a weather alert system restricted by a 
fee or other form of barrier), or a local public good (e.g., a dyke).
8
Economic theory suggests that such goods should be self-supplied by the individuals, firms or 
local communities that benefit from them and not by national governments. Similarly, from an 
international point of view, economic theory suggests that adaptation measures that benefit 
individual countries should be self-financed by the countries themselves and not by the 
international community.
9
The rationale for public provision of resources for adaptation is thus less obvious than in the 
mitigation case. The circumstances under which public intervention may still be justified are 
                                                 
8 Adaptation also provides genuine global public goods in some cases, such as for, example, R&D on new heat-
tolerant crops. Even then, however, the service provided by these public goods is only a fraction of the service 
provided by the public goods ‘quality of the atmosphere’. For example, heat-tolerant crops will help farmers mitigate 
the impacts of climate change, but will make no difference for the impact of sea-level rise, or of increased frequency 
of extreme weather events. Whereas reducing GHG emissions provides all these services at the same time. 
9 The categories used above may have different manifestations if ‘private good’ refers to a country rather than to a 
household or a firm. Similarly, ‘club goods’ may differ depending on whether they refer to a group of households or 
firms, versus to a group of countries; and ‘local public goods’ may be different at sub-national level vs. at the trans-
national (but still not global) level. 
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discussed below, successively from the point of view of a developing country, and from the point 
of view of the international community and developed countries.
10  
Rationale for some public intervention with regard to adaptation within countries 
Public intervention may be justified for efficiency and equity reasons, since there are many 
instances in which the private supply of adaptation response by households, firms or local 
communities could be insufficient, e.g. due to: 
Imperfect information: The existing information about the costs and benefits of adaptation—
particularly proactive adaptation—is often not available to households and firms in developing 
countries. Hence the need for publicly provided R&D programs to create/improve knowledge 
about adaptation in the first place, and for information disclosure and education programs to 
disseminate information as widely as possible. These programs also serve indirectly to coordinate 
expectations (see point on externalities below).  
Barriers to collective action (local public goods): In some cases, proactive adaptation requires 
the provision of local public goods such as irrigation networks or seawalls. Yet the households, 
firms or local communities involved may not be able to agree on cooperative action to provide 
the public good even if it is within their collective interest and financial ability to do so. Public 
action
11 is then needed to facilitate and/or force the adoption of the cooperative equilibrium 
through such interventions as, inter alia, setting standards or other forms of regulations, creating 
organizing fora, or mediating negotiations. 
Moral hazard/free rider problems: Private decisions regarding adaptation measures might be 
biased if households, firms or local communities, expecting the government or international relief 
agencies to provide for part or all of reactive adaptation costs, respond by adopting behaviors that 
are more risk-prone than they would otherwise have.  
Externalities: Some adaptation decisions involve negative externalities that create a wedge 
between individual and collective optima. For example, power outages have demonstrated 
                                                 
10 Another policy implication of the fact that the benefits of adaptation are local is that the distribution of adaptation 
expenditures across sectors and regions—and not only their aggregate level—matters for global efficiency. This 
contrasts with mitigation in which, provided there exists a mechanism to equalize marginal abatement costs across 
regions (i.e., cap-and-trade or uniform tax on emissions), the location of mitigation actions does not matter for global 
efficiency in a first-order approximation (see Chichilnisky et al., 2000 and Chao and Peck, 2000 for a discussion on 
the separability between equity and efficiency in the context of mitigation).  
11 In the case of the private sector, and public action at a higher level of government in the case of local 
governments. 
  9 
negative impacts on economic growth that go well beyond the private losses incurred by the 
energy company. Similarly, high private/local discount rates might make it cost-efficient for 
some private project developers to build infrastructure in areas that are likely to be flooded, 
though public costs of flooding (e.g., temporary housing of refugees, medical costs of diseases 
and deaths, economic disruptions induced by the flood, etc.) might be much higher—hence the 
need for public action to address the spillovers ex ante.  
Network / public good aspects of high-fixed cost assets: Among the assets to be protected from 
climate change are assets that have a network effects / public good quality (as well as high fixed 
costs), such as transport infrastructure, telecom networks, power plants or energy transportation 
infrastructure (i.e., pipelines or power grids).
12 The protection of these assets from the impacts of 
climate change is all the more important since they generate important returns for society by 
providing essential services, such as energy, transportation or telecommunication, which need to 
continue functioning in emergency periods such as during storms, floods, or heat waves.  
Poverty and budget constraints: Some individuals, firms or local communities—especially the 
poorest—may be unable to afford anticipative adaptation even though it would be cost-effective 
for them to do so.  
To sum up, despite the fact that adaptation yields mostly private or local public benefits, 
economic theory suggests that there is a wide range of reasons why national governments 
(whether in developed or developing countries) should intervene with regard to adaptation, and a 
wide range of instruments that governments can use ranging from indirect action such as 
information provision, standard setting, etc. to direct actions such as financing and direct 
provision of adaptation resources and institutions. 
In any case, the cost-benefit criterion applies for government action, as well as, for private 
actions. The government should thus only support anticipative adaptation measures to the extent 
that the benefits to society outweigh the public costs of implementation. Public cost-benefit 
analysis provides a framework for making such evaluations.  
                                                 
12 There is a controversy among economists as to whether the Government should provide some of the 
aforementioned assets. Even if they are privately provided, Government intervention remains necessary to make sure 
that adaptation considerations are adequately factored into the design and management of these assets by the private 
sector. 
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Rationale for public intervention by the international community with regard to adaptation 
There are an analogous set of rationale at the global level for public intervention by developed 
countries and international development agencies to support adaptation in developing countries, 
despite the fact that most of the benefits may be local. 
Regional/transnational public goods: Some adaptation measures require the provision of 
regional/transnational public goods that member countries either cannot afford or have 
difficulties agreeing upon.  
Moral hazard/free rider problems: Governments / countries may adopt more risky behaviors if 
they expect international agencies/donor countries to provide funds should climate-related crisis 
occur—hence the need for all countries and development agencies to create and adopt 
mechanisms to discourage such behavior. 
Regional/global externalities/spillovers: Some of the adverse effects of climate change can 
spill over into neighboring countries even though the level of anticipative or reactive adaptation 
might be optimal from the individual country’s point of view. On this basis, the international 
community might provide support, in the form of e.g., financial or technological transfers or of 
capacity building, to improve anticipative and reactive adaptation and thus limit the externality.
13  
Poverty/budget constraints: Developing countries may be unable, budget-wise, to finance all 
the anticipative adaptation measures that are cost-effective for them.  
Adaptation related to development aid: Some investments in developing countries are already 
supported in part by foreign governments through bilateral or multilateral development 
assistance. Analyzing the vulnerability of internationally supported projects and programs —both 
existing and planned ones, and especially those involving long-lived, fixed capital stock—to 
climate change, and providing corrections whenever appropriate is critical for multilateral, 
bilateral and non-governmental aid providers (e.g., AfD, 2005).  
Compensation for past emissions by developed countries: An argument is often made that 
industrialized countries should provide financing for adaptation as a compensation for the 
damages that they impose on developing countries through their past emissions. This is a very 
controversial issue that would warrant a full analysis by itself. We simply note here that 
compensations for past emissions are difficult to assess in an economic analysis because the 
                                                 
13 The presence of regional/global externalities or spillovers also affects the global level of mitigation that should be 
provided by the international community. 
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existence and value of the compensations depend on the starting point of the analysis, which is a 
policy parameter.
14  
To sum up, there is also at the international level a large set of rationale for public intervention 
to support developing countries with regard to adaptation.  
Based on the preceding discussion, the total climate bill consists of four different components: 
mitigation, anticipative or proactive adaptation, coping or reactive adaptation, and ultimate 
damages. In the presence of climate change a laisser-faire (no action) policy will result in 
high ultimate damages. These ultimate damages can adversely affect growth and development 
strategies (Lecocq and Shalizi 2007). Policy actions associated with mitigation, proactive 
adaptation and reactive adaptation can reduce ultimate damages and the total climate bill—
mitigation and proactive adaptation being incurred before damages materialize and reactive 
adaptation after climate change events. However, there may still be some ultimate damages that 
cannot be removed (‘remaining ultimate damages’) because they are technically or economically 
irreversible. 
The partial equilibrium model developed in the following section incorporates mitigation, 
proactive adaptation, reactive adaptation, and ultimate damages at the global and national levels. 
Incorporating adaptation concerns increases the relevance of this framework, particularly for 
developing countries—including those that have limited opportunities for mitigation but face 
potentially significant impacts from the changing climate. However, given the increasing 
interconnections of economies globally, even adaptation concerns will exhibit global 
ramifications. The model is used to explore optimal resource allocation between mitigation, 
proactive adaptation, reactive adaptation and ultimate damages. By using the benevolent planner 
metaphor, we explore the cooperative equilibrium among countries, and we leave issues related 
to cooperation and strategic behavior aside.  
3.  Balance between mitigation, proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation in a model 
without uncertainty and without budget constraint  
In this section, we build a partial equilibrium model of climate policies including mitigation, 
proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation. The first-order conditions derived in this section are 
                                                 
14 International transfers to compensate for ‘excess damages’ suffered by some countries do appear naturally in 
intertemporal versions of the Bowen-Lindhal-Samuelson model for the provision of global public goods when 
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similar to those obtained by Kane and Shogren (2000). Our framework, however, extends Kane 
and Shogren’s in four ways. First, both anticipative and reactive adaptation are considered. 
Second, our model considers multiple regions/sectors and not one. Third, our model is dynamic 
and not static. And fourth, uncertainty and learning on both the magnitude and the distribution of 
impacts are introduced, as well as, budget constraints. (Only risk on the magnitude of impacts 
was included in Kane and Shogren’s model.) 
3.1.  Structure of the model 
Time is indexed by t = 1,2, … ,T. Economic sectors are indexed by i = 1,2, … ,I—thus allowing 
to differentiate sectors by their degree of climate sensitiveness. Regions are indexed by 
j = 1,2, … ,J—thus allowing to differentiate regions by their degree of vulnerability to climate 
change. A subscript pair (i,j) thus represents sector i in region j. At this stage, the scope of the 
model is global, so the set of sectors and regions is large enough to encompass all major 
sectors/regions in the World. 
To discuss resource allocation at the country level or transfers of resources across countries, it 
is necessary to know which regions and sectors are within each country. Let countries be indexed 
by k = 1,2, … ,K. We denote Ck as the subset of all pairs (i,j) that are in country k. Though areas 
that are similar in terms of climate impacts may extend over multiple countries, we assume here 
that regions i are fine enough to fit within national borders.
15
 There are three control variables in the model: mitigation, proactive adaptation, and reactive 
adaptation. 
We denote Pijt the amount of money spent on proactive adaptation in sector i within region j 
during period t, and Rijt the amount of money spent on reactive adaptation in the same sector, 
place, and time period. In the absence of a common performance indicator for adaptation 
activities across sectors and regions, the policy variable for both anticipative and reactive 
adaptation must be the amount of money spent on adaptation. 
By contrast, a physical indicator is selected as the policy variable for mitigation. We denote 
Aijt as the amount of greenhouse gases abated relative to business-as-usual in sector i within 
                                                                                                                                                              
damages of pollution are differentiated across countries (Lecocq and Hourcade, 2003). 
15 Small countries may have only one region, whereas large countries will have several. Similarly, small economies 
may have only one sector, whereas large economies will typically have many sectors, some of which are climate-
sensitive, some of which are not. 
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region j during period t, and Cijt(Aijt) as the costs of mitigation. Cost functions are assumed three-
times differentiable, and we make the standard assumptions that marginal abatement costs are 
positive ( ) and concave (  and  0 > ′ ijt C 0 > ′ ′ ijt C 0 > ′ ′ ′ ijt C ).  
Impacts of climate change in sector i, region j and period t are denoted as Dijt. Because climate 
change is a stock externality, damages depend on the chronicle of past emissions—and therefore 
on the chronicle of past abatement decisions. Let At be the total amount of emission reductions 
relative to business-as-usual over all sectors and regions at period t. We make the standard 
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. Finally, we assume that marginal damages tend to infinity when At 
tends to 0 to ensure that the problem has an interior solution.
16
Proactive adaptation in sector i and region j at period t reduces future damages in that 
particular region and sector (targeted measures) and, possibly, in others as well (non-targeted 
measures). Targeted proactive adaptation includes most measures involving fixed capital, such as 
building seawalls, insulating buildings or reinforcing roads and bridges. Non-targeted proactive 
adaptation includes mostly “soft” adaptation measures, such as developing insurance 
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.We also assume that marginal damages tend to 
infinity when Pt tends to 0 to ensure that the problem has an interior solution. 
Last, damages at period t in sector/region i,j depend on reactive adaptation expenses Rijt in that 
particular sector and region. The difference between proactive adaptation (and, for that matter, 
mitigation) and reactive adaptation is that the former reduces impacts at future periods, whereas 
the latter reduces impacts occurring now. In other words, reactive adaptation is the only control 
variable remaining to somehow limit the impacts/negative consequences of climate change when 
                                                 
16 This condition is not strictly necessary for the purpose of the model, but it simplifies the solution by avoiding the 
need to consider the possibility of corner solutions. 

















they occur. We also assume that reactive damages reduce damages   but with 

















. We also assume that marginal damages tend to –infinity when 
R tends to 0 to ensure interior solutions.
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Proper resource allocation would require a complete set of welfare functions aggregating the 
utility levels of individuals in each region. To simplify, a cost-minimization approach is used, in 
which monetary costs and benefits are aggregated. For the approximation to remain valid, (i) the 
weights attached to each individual’s utility function must be assumed proportional to the 
individual’s income (Negishi weighting);
18 and (ii) the national climate bill (the costs of 
mitigation, proactive adaptation, reactive adaptation and remaining ultimate damages combined) 
must remain limited relative to national income—say less than 10%—so that utility can be 
considered linear in expenditures. Countries with a very low asset base and where climate 
damages are potentially very high are under-weighted in the model below.  
3.2.  The resource allocation problem and its solution 
We assume a central planner that seeks to minimize the world climate bill. If r is the discount 
rate, the cost-minimization program is as follows: 
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17 Damages in one sector / region might also depend on damages in others if spillovers such as trade effects, 
migrations or conflicts occur. To keep the model simple, we do not take negative spillovers from damages into 
account explicitly, though positive spillovers on proactive adaptation capture some of the same dynamics.  
18 For an exploration of alternative specifications, see Lecocq and Hourcade (2003). 
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In this benchmark case, full certainty is assumed about the impacts of climate change. A 
model with uncertainty will be developed in section 3. It is also assumed that there are enough 
resources available worldwide to finance mitigation, proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation, 
and that the planner can allocate these resources wherever necessary. National budget constraints 
and international transfers will be discussed in section 4.  
Finally, this model cannot pick up whether mitigation and adaptation expenditures listed here 
should be financed by the private sector or by the public sector—since no distinction is made 
between the two. Disentangling the two, particularly for adaptation expenses, would require an 
explicit representation of the local public goods and externalities associated with some adaptation 
expenditures. This extension is beyond the scope of the present paper, and is left for future 
research.  
With the assumptions made on the mitigation cost and damage functions, there is a unique 
interior solution to problem (1)-(2). Simple algebra yields the following first-order conditions 
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Equations (3)-(5) are standard first-order optimal conditions for pollution control problems. 
Equations (3) states that mitigation should be undertaken up to the point where the marginal costs 
of abatement are equal to the discounted sum of the marginal benefits of abatement in terms of 
avoided damages in the future. Equations (3) also imply that overall costs are minimized when 
abatement costs are equalized across regions and sectors—another standard result. 
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Equation (4) states that reactive adaptation should be financed up to the point where the last 
dollar spent on reactive adaptation reduces residual damages by one dollar.  
Equation (5) states that anticipative adaptation in sector i, region j and period t should be 
financed up to the point where the sum of marginal reductions in future damages, properly 
discounted, exactly matches the marginal amount spent on proactive adaptation. This standard 
optimality condition allows for distinguishing between ‘targeted’ and ‘non-targeted’ proactive 
adaptation. All things equal, the more regions and sectors are affected by a proactive adaptation 
measure, the higher are its marginal benefits, and thus the more it should be financed. 
3.3.  Implications for the balance between mitigation and adaptation 
As first noted by Shibata and Winrich (1983) in examining the general problem of optimal 
environmental taxation when both the polluter and the affected parties have ways to reduce 
pollution, the optimal levels of emission reduction and of defensive measures (adaptation in our 
framework) are typically interdependent, i.e., the optimal level of adaptation depends on the level 
of mitigation and vice-versa. 
In our model, the optimal levels of mitigation deriving from equation (3) and the optimal 


















 and   were zero, that is if the sensitivity of damages to 
abatement did not depend on the amount of proactive or reactive adaptation. But many proactive 
adaptation measures operate precisely by reducing the sensitivity of particular sectors and regions 
to climate, so that activity can continue in that particular sector at that particular place under a 
wider range of climatic conditions. 
For example, elevating a seawall protects the coast from some sea-surges, thereby allowing 
coastal activities to persist under higher climate change scenarios—and thus under scenarios with 
lower abatement. Similarly, building dams and irrigation systems allow farmers to maintain 
agricultural output under lower precipitation levels (up to a certain limit, of course)—thereby 
making agriculture in that particular region less prone to climate change; and mitigation less 
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beneficial in that particular sector/region, to the extent it is high enough to allow for the minimal 
precipitation required.
19
A To illustrate this point, let   be the minimum level of abatement under which activity in 
section/region (i,j) can continue in the absence of adaptation, and  A be the minimum level of 
abatement under which this activity can continue with adaptation (Figure 1, upper part). By 
construction  A A A< A , and for abatement levels between   and  , marginal damages are flat with 








A A  is non-zero, and potentially large, between   and  . 
The interdependence between mitigation and adaptation has three implications. First, it 
reinforces the importance of increasing knowledge about the costs and benefits of adaptation—an 
area currently underdeveloped relative to mitigation. Second, it suggests that introducing 
adaptation in numerical models that assess the costs and benefits of climate policies is very 
important—not as an add-on, but as a potentially important factor in shaping mitigation 
decisions.
20 Third, from a policy perspective, it suggests that mitigation policies and adaptation 
policies should be negotiated jointly, and not separately as is essentially the case today. 
3.4.  Implications for the balance between proactive and reactive adaptation 
Similarly, the optimal levels of proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation are not likely to be 
independent. Technically, the optimal level of reactive adaptation deriving from equation (4) and 
the optimal level of proactive adaptation deriving from equation (5) are independent if and only if 








 is zero. 
But in many instances, proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation are substitutes. For example, 
                                                 
19 This is an argument about the substitutability between mitigation and adaptation. It differs from the observation 
often made that, in certain sectors such as forestry or hydropower generation, mitigation and adaptation are joint 
products. For example, building a hydroelectric dam reduces emissions in the energy sector, but also makes the 
energy sector more climate-sensitive. This is already a major issue for countries like Colombia, where increasing the 
share of hydro in power generation is a way for the country to capture international flows of resources from the 
Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, yet where adapting to lower snow precipitation in the Andes 
may require, on the contrary, diversifying away from hydro. 
20 Similar exercises are already conducted when additional mitigation opportunities are taken into account. For 
example, Gitz et al. (2006) show that accounting for the possibility of setting up large-scale plantations worldwide 
changes the magnitude and time-path of the optimal abatement trajectory.  
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when zoning laws prevent households and firms from locating in flood-prone areas, the need for 
reactive adaptation (e.g., emergency evacuation) is significantly lower than in the case where the 
flood occurs in the absence of adopting or enforcing a zoning policy. As a result, there is a range 
of proactive adaptation levels in which the sensitivity of ultimate damages to reactive adaptation 
is lower than without proactive adaptation. 
Though substitutability appears commonplace, the relationship between proactive and reactive 
adaptation is more ambiguous than the relationship between mitigation and adaptation. In fact, 
proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation may also be complements—for example, rapid 
response teams need to be constituted, trained and set up in advance (proactive adaptation) so that 
they can be deployed when an extreme weather event occurs (reactive adaptation)—or even 
independent of one another—for example when damages (e.g., to agriculture) depend only on 
water deficit, in which case impacts and opportunities for reactive adaptation are the same if there 
is no dam and climate change reduces water availability by x, or if there is a dam of capacity y 
and climate change reduces water availability by x+y.
21  
                                                 
21 The model without uncertainty without budget constraint can also be applied at the country level. To do so, only 
mitigation, proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation in sectors/regions within Ck are policy variables. Mitigation, 
proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation in other countries are exogenous. In this context, the optimal solution 
for the national planner may differ from the global optimum if other countries make 'mistakes' in their mitigation 
and—provided it has spillovers in country k—proactive adaptation decisions. This raises an issue of gaming across 
countries, which is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
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4.  Balance between mitigation, proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation in a model 
with uncertainty and learning, but without budget constraint 
Despite great scientific progress about climate change, Lester Lave’s remark that policy decisions 
with regard to climate change are taken “in a sea of uncertainty” (1991) remains valid. And it is 
well-known that taking uncertainties and learning into account strongly affect optimal mitigation 
policies, especially in the presence of inertia (e.g., Arrow et al., 1996). 
Here we extend this reasoning to mitigation, proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation by 
introducing uncertainty on damage functions.
22 There are s∈{1,2, … ,S} states of the world, to 
which the planner attaches an ex ante distribution of probability ps. Each state of the world is 
characterized by a different set of damage functions {Dijt}, indexed by s. There is also a period τ 
at the beginning of which uncertainty is resolved, i.e., at the beginning of which the real state of 
the world is revealed. To simplify the model, damages before the date of resolution of uncertainty 
are assumed to be known with certainty from the start.
23
24 Assuming risk-neutrality,  the planner’s decision problem with uncertainty is as follows:  
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           (7) 
Aijt1 = … = Aijts     ∀t∈{1, … ,τ-1}    ∀(i,j)∈{1, … ,I}× {1, … ,J}   (8) 
Pijt1 = … = Pijts     ∀t∈{1, … ,τ-1}    ∀(i,j)∈{1, … ,I}× {1, … ,J}   (9) 
Rijt1 = … = Rijts     ∀t∈{1, … ,τ-1}    ∀(i,j)∈{1, … ,I}× {1, … ,J}   (10) 
Dijt1 = … = Dijts     ∀t∈{1, … ,τ-1}    ∀(i,j)∈{1, … ,I}× {1, … ,J}   (11) 
                                                 
22 To limit the complexity of the model, uncertainties on abatement cost functions or on the discount rate are not 
taken into account. 
23 In fact, there is no reason why the date at which controversies regarding future damage functions are expected to 
be resolved should be identical to the date at which damage functions, as seen from today, start to become uncertain. 
Adding this feature, however, does not modify the results of the paper, but adds to the complexity of the model.   
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Since uncertainty is not resolved before period τ, the planner must make contingent plans 
before that point—hence conditions (8) and (9). Conditions (10) and (11) derive from the 
assumption made above that damages before resolution of uncertainty are known with certainty. 
In this model, it is again assumed that there is no budget constraint at the global level in all the 
scenarios, and that resources are pooled and used to finance mitigation, proactive adaptation and 
reactive adaptation wherever necessary. 
The central policy question raised by model (6)-(11) is how to allocate resources prior to 
resolution of uncertainty. We thus present the first-order optimality conditions for mitigation and 
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Equations (12)-(14) are standard first-order optimal conditions for pollution control problems 
under uncertainty. Equation (12) states that mitigation should be undertaken up to the point 
where the marginal costs of abatement are equal to the discounted sum of the marginal benefits of 
abatement in terms of avoided damages in the future over all scenarios, weighted by probability 
of occurrence. The policy implications of equation (12) for mitigation have been extensively 
discussed elsewhere (e.g., Ha-Duong et al., 1997), and the only point worth mentioning for the 
                                                                                                                                                              
24 Other assumptions about risk aversion would lead to different numerical results, but with no change to the 
qualitative findings made in this section. 
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purpose of the present paper is that the optimal level of mitigation is sensitive only to the 
aggregate damages in each scenario, not to individual regional or sectoral damage functions.  
Equation (13) states that reactive adaptation should be financed up to the point where the last 
dollar spent on reactive adaptation reduces residual damages by one dollar. It is unchanged 
relative to the certainty case (equation 4) because reactive adaptation takes place at the time 
damages occur, thus at a time when the uncertainty on damages has already been lifted. 
Equation (14) states that anticipative adaptation in sector i, region j and period t should be 
financed up to the point where the sum of marginal reductions in expected future damages, 
properly discounted and weighted by probability of occurrence, exactly matches the marginal 
amount spent on proactive adaptation. 
We had already noted in section 3 that all things equal, ‘non-targeted’ proactive adaptation 
measures had higher benefits than ‘targeted’ ones because they reduced damages in a wider range 
of sectors/regions. Equation (14) reveals a supplemental benefit of ‘non-targeted’ measures, in 
that the wider their scope, the lower the risks of misallocation of funds associated with the 
uncertainty on the geographical and sectoral distribution of damages.  
To make this point explicit, let us assume that there are two periods and that scenarios 1 to S 
represent S possible locations of a single extreme weather event with expected probability 1/S in 
the second period. When the event hits one region, damages in other regions are assumed 



















1      ∀j ∈ {1, … ,J}     (15) 
 
Whereas if one knew where the extreme weather event would hit—say in region 1 without loss 
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P2t = P3t = … = PJt = 0           ( 1 7 )  
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Equation (15) states that, when the location of an extreme weather event is uncertain, it is 
optimal to engage in proactive adaptation in all the regions that have a chance of being hit, even 
though all but one of these expenditures will be lost.
26 Less adaptation is undertaken in each 
region (adaptation expenditures are stopped when their marginal benefits is S dollar to one) than 
would be in the region that is going to be hit in the certainty case (equation 16, adaptation 
expenditures are stopped when their marginal benefits is 1 dollar to one). But in aggregate it is 
not clear whether more or less resources are devoted to proactive adaptation in the uncertainty 
case relative to the certainty case. This depends on the shape of the damage functions. 
In this framework, ‘non-targeted’ proactive adaptation measures fare better than ‘targeted’ 
ones. Assuming that they reduce damages in n out of the S regions that might be hit by the 
extreme weather event, and assuming further—to simplify notations—that when a region is hit, 
the damage function is the same, then the marginal benefits of ‘non-targeted’ proactive 
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What are the implications for mitigation? As noted above, the optimal level of mitigation 
depends only on the sum of marginal damages across regions and sectors. Thus, if there is 
certainty that the extreme weather event will hit once, and if damages are the same regardless of 
where it hits, then the optimal level of mitigation with uncertainty on location is governed by the 
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25 Subscripts i are dropped for convenience. 
26 It is assumed in the model that proactive adaptation expenditures are divisible. What happens when proactive 
adaptation expenditures are not divisible could be an interesting topic for future research. 
27 Subscript j is dropped from the damage function because damages are assumed identical when the extreme 
weather event hits regardless of the region. 
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Since mitigation reduces damages regardless of where they occur, its marginal benefits are not 
affected by uncertainty over the distribution of impacts. (They are of course affected by the 
uncertainty over the magnitude of impacts.) And since less proactive adaptation is undertaken in 
each region than would be in the certainty case, more mitigation may be necessary to meet 
condition (19) when mitigation and proactive adaptation are substitutes (cf. section 3.3). 
The optimal level of reactive adaptation in the region that is effectively hit by the extreme 
weather event is also likely to vary relative to the certainty case. Following the discussion of 
section 3.4, however, the variation may go in either direction. If proactive adaptation and reactive 
adaptation are substitutes, more reactive adaptation will be necessary at the optimum to 
compensate for the lower proactive adaptation. But if proactive adaptation and reactive 
adaptation are complements, reactive adaptation will decrease—which will trigger both a 
supplemental increase in the optimal level of mitigation, and a higher level of ultimate damages. 
The policy implication at the global level of the model with uncertainty on location is that the 
benefits of mitigation and reactive adaptation are more important relative to the benefits of 
‘targeted’ proactive adaptation—relative to the certainty case—because the benefits of ‘targeted’ 
measures are lost. The optimal level of mitigation is likely to be higher than in the certainty case, 
and the optimal level of reactive adaptation might also be higher or lower depending on the 
relationships between proactive and reactive adaptation in the damage function. 
The policy implication of the model with uncertainty is more complex at the local level. Let us 
assume that country k has only one region that might be hit by the extreme weather event. In this 
case, equation (15) tells us that fewer resources should be devoted to proactive adaptation. Yet 
since the aggregate level of mitigation is outside the control of any single country, there is no 
assurance that the aggregate level of mitigation will increase to take uncertainty on location into 
account. If this is the case, a higher level of reactive adaptation will be needed to compensate for 
the non-optimal level of mitigation. 
5.  Balance between mitigation, proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation in a model 
with uncertainty, learning, and budget constraints 
In the previous two models, it was assumed that there were enough resources available 
worldwide to finance mitigation, proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation, and that the 
planner could allocate these resources freely as necessary. But this may not be so globally if the 
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need for adaptation grows due to further delays in adopting and implementing mitigation 
measures. In addition, some countries may be unable, budget-wise, to finance all the mitigation, 
proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation that are cost-effective for them—let alone all the 
mitigation, proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation that are beneficial to the whole World 
given externalities. And transfers from current resources in rich countries to countries in need of 
adaptation might be constrained or unfeasible for political reasons.
28
In this section, we add budget constraints to the model (5.1) and discuss implications for the 
balance between mitigation, proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation (5.2). Since neither 
reactive nor proactive adaptation provide a satisfactory answer to the constraints imposed by 
uncertainty on location and risks of future budget constraints, a third instrument—rainy-day 
funds—is explored in subsection (5.3). We start the discussion with a national budget constraint, 
move to a national rainy-day fund, and then conclude with a global rainy-day fund.  
5.1.  The model with national budget constraints 
We introduce national budget constraints to the model. Technically, let   be the maximum 
available resources to finance mitigation, proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation at period t 
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With equations (20), it is assumed that there is no barrier to transfer of resources across sectors 
and regions within each country.
29 But at this stage in the analysis the transfer of resources both 
across countries and across time are also not allowed. 
In addition, a technical condition must be added to ensure that there is uncertainty only after 
period τ.  
 





                                                 
28 The difficulties the international community is having to increase aid budgets in developed countries is one 
example of such policy constraints on transfers.  
29 Subnational regional budget constraints might also be relevant, especially in large, decentralized countries. A 
model with the three levels (global, national, subnational regional) is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
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When equations (20)-(21) are added to the resource allocation problem under uncertainty (6)-
(11),
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In equations (22)-(24), k(i,j) denotes the country to which the sector/region (i,j) belongs, and 
 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with budget constraint (20) in country k, at period t 
and in scenario s.
) , ( j i k
ts π
31 The Lagrange multipliers measure how strongly each budget constraint is 
binding. 
Interpreting equations (22)-(24) is straightforward. To do so, it is useful to distinguish between 
early and late budget constraints. Early budget constraints restrict the financing of mitigation and 
proactive adaptation. In our model, those are budget constraints occurring before uncertainty is 
resolved. Late budget constraints restrict the financing of reactive adaptation. In our model, those 
are budget constraints occurring after uncertainty is resolved. 
Equations (22) states that with binding early national budget constraints and no transfers, 
marginal abatement costs cannot be equalized. It is easy to verify that allowing for international 
transfers would equalize marginal abatement costs across countries and increase efficiency. If in 
addition there is no budget constraint at the global level, then marginal costs and marginal 
benefits of adaptation can be equalized. 
                                                 
30 In this model, countries cooperate to find a solution—hence the global planner—, but they are not necessarily 
willing or able to make the necessary payments or transfers—hence the budget constraints and absence of transfers. 
31 Subscripts s disappear from Lagrange multipliers prior to period τ because the budget constraints are not scenario-
dependent before this point. 
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Similarly, equation (23) and (24) state that reactive (resp. proactive) adaptation cannot be 
funded at the optimum in countries where the budget constraint is binding. Again allowing for 
international transfers in the future (now) would allow for an equalization of marginal benefits of 
reactive (proactive) adaptation across countries.  
5.2.  Implications for the balance between mitigation, proactive adaptation and reactive 
adaptation 
With early budget constraint, but no late budget constraint expected because of economic 
growth 
In this case, proactive adaptation and mitigation cannot be funded sufficiently, and reactive 
adaptation remains the only policy solution to reduce damages. 
At the global level, the model suggests that international transfer of resources should be 
concentrated in countries where budget constraints are the most binding. Mitigation and 
adaptation measures with major spillovers, or where reactive adaptation will not help cope in the 
future (i.e., where reactive adaptation and proactive adaptation are complements or independent 
from one another) are priority targets. 
At the national level, the model suggests the priority of targeting scarce resources now to 
proactive adaptation in the regions/sectors where spillovers are the most important and where 
reactive adaptation cannot help cope because proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation are 
complementary. 
Without early budget constraint, but with risks of late budget constraint because of revenue 
cyclicality, random shocks (e.g., monetary crisis) or climate-change induced shocks. 
At the global level, the model suggests one of two things: If international transfers from resource-
rich to resource-starved countries are expected to be feasible in the future—both financially (no 
constraint on resources at the global level) and politically, no increase in mitigation or reactive 
adaptation is necessary now: future transfers will correct the future budget constraints when and 
where they occur. 
However, if international transfers from resource-rich to resource-starved countries are 
expected to be difficult in the future, e.g. because climate impacts might trigger financial 
constraints throughout the World, or because political barriers to transfers might be as acute as 
they are now. In this case, more proactive adaptation and more mitigation should be financed (to 
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the extent that mitigation and reactive adaptation are substitutes, and that proactive adaptation 
and reactive adaptation are substitutes) to compensate for the possible lack of funding for reactive 
adaptation. 
At the national level, the model suggests the priority of targeting resources now to 
sectors/regions where proactive and reactive adaptation are substitutes, so that the need for 
reactive adaptation is minimized in the future (e.g., moving people out of harm’s way in advance, 
so that there are fewer damages). The importance of proactive adaptation will be all the higher if 
the late budget constraint risk is correlated with the occurrence of high damages because the 
fiscal base is wiped out. 
5.3.  Rainy-day funds as a partial solution to the uncertainty / budget constraint dilemma 
The discussion above shows that neither reactive nor proactive adaptation provides a satisfactory 
answer to the constraints imposed by uncertainty on location and risks of future budget 
constraints. Proactive adaptation, at least when ‘targeted’, is susceptible to costly errors when the 
location of damages is uncertain. Reactive adaptation, on the other hand, is at risk if there are 
likely to be budget constraints at the time climate change events have an impact. 
Allowing for financial transfers from periods where resources are abundant to periods where 
budgets are constrained would solve this dilemma. Such transfers would provide flexibility for 
targeting the sectors/regions that end up being affected by climate change, while reducing the risk 
that budget constraints prevent cost-effective reactive adaptation measures from being 
implemented. They would also be immune to the risk, inherent in ‘targeted’ proactive adaptation, 
that the funds might be misdirected to the wrong sector/region. 
Private insurance markets fulfill exactly this function, but they may not be able to respond to 
all the needs. In fact, even in developed countries, insurance markets cover only part of the 
climate-related risks. In addition, most of these products are unavailable in developing countries 
where, among other things, sovereign risks are judged as too high (and only specialized funds or 
funds with public guarantees like MIGA operate). Though this gap may be reduced in the future 
as developing country economies expand, some climate-related risks may prove not to be 
insurable at all. Potential losses may become too high, making premiums unaffordable.
32 
                                                 
32 For example, premiums for forest insurance skyrocketed after the twin December 1999 hurricanes that swept 
through Europe, de facto driving most forest owners out of insurance altogether. 
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Actuarial returns may be difficult to compute when the frequency and/or magnitude of the losses 
increase, and when the rate at which they increase is itself uncertain. Where spatial/ geographic 
correlations between losses increase, insurance margins may be eroded further. 
Setting up public “stabilization” funds or rainy-day funds might thus be necessary to 
complement private insurance markets. A rainy-day fund is basically a self-insurance mechanism 
at the country level: it collects resources in years where the budget constraint is not binding to 
support reactive adaptation when impacts materialize. Stabilization funds are already commonly 
used. They are in general aimed at smoothing public spending by saving during booms and using 
the balances to cover public revenue shortfalls during recessions. Stabilization funds exist in most 
U.S. states and they have been used in many countries, including developing countries (Fasano, 
2000). Experience so far suggests that rainy-day funds do reduce expenditure volatility, but that 
the institutional arrangements matter, notably the stringency of deposit and withdrawal rules 
(e.g., Sobel and Holcombe, 1996).  
 In a partial equilibrium framework, an intertemporal resource transfer is cost-effective only if 
the returns to the sums invested are higher than or equal to the discount rate. However, the returns 
to investment in a rainy-day fund may be lower than the rate of discount,
33 for at least three 
reasons. First, balances must remain available at all times because the date at which impacts 
occur is uncertain, and liquid investments have typically lower rates of returns than illiquid ones. 
Second, governments are likely to prefer low-risk financial investments to protect the capital, and 
lower risk usually implies lower returns. Finally, stabilization funds are tempting targets for 
governments, especially when returns are high and balances large. There is thus a risk that the 
funds will be rerouted to other purposes—a risk that legal dispositions can only partially 
mitigate.
34  
Yet equation (23) shows that rainy-day funds with returns lower than the discount rate can still 
be cost-effective, if in the absence of rainy-day funds, late budget constraints leave reactive 
                                                 
33 As noted in Section 2, the value of the discount rate to be used in cost-benefit analysis of climate policies is very 
controversial (e.g., Portney and Weyant, 1999), as the ongoing controversy over the Stern Review of the economics 
of climate change (2007) illustrates again. If discount rates in the 1%-2% range are selected, then rainy-day funds, 
even with low returns, are more likely to be deemed cost-effective in the first place. Even with standard assumptions 
about pure time preference, long-term growth rate and intertemporal elasticity of marginal utility, uncertainty on 
future growth rates provides a rationale for adopting lower discount rates as the time horizon increases (Weitzman, 
1998), thus making rainy-day funds more attractive. 
34 This risk exists both in democratic regimes, where the rules governing the rainy-day fund can be changed by 
Parliaments, and in autocratic regimes where rulers can change the rules as they wish. 
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adaptation measures with high returns without financing. The social benefits of any additional 
dollar available at that period are thus high and may offset the low returns of the fund. 
To see how, let π (π ≥0) be the shadow price of the budget constraint (20) at future period t’ 
and ρ be the average annual rate of return to the capital invested in the rainy-day fund. ρ is 
uncertain, with an expected value ρ  positive but lower than r. At the margin, one dollar should 
be invested in a rainy-day fund instead of being invested elsewhere in the economy if:  
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For example, if ρ is normally distributed around ρ  with variance σρ
2, then condition (25) is 
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For a discount factor of 5%, an expected rate of returns of the rainy-day fund of 2% and a 
standard deviation of 0.01 (i.e., the rate of return to the fund has a 95% chance of being between 
0% and 4% in any given year), the benefits to an additional dollars π must be at least 0.58 for 
damages occurring 20 years in the future—that is one more dollar spent in reactive adaptation 
saves $1.58 in damages—, and 1.37 for damages occurring 50 years in the future. These values 
are large but not unrealistic.  
We have so far discussed rainy-day funds at the national level, but such an instrument is all the 
more interesting relative to local proactive adaptation measures if the geographical / sectoral 
basis of the fund is large because early budget constraints are likely to be less binding at the 
global level than at the local level—so the amount of resources available for savings is likely to 
be higher. In addition, when the rainy-day fund balance can be used in a large range of 
sectors/regions, the risk that damages fall outside of this range will be lower. If the rainy-day 
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fund is global, this risk disappears entirely. Finally, the more global the fund, the wider the 
investment opportunities and the lower the risks to the savings in the fund.
35
Finally, limitations to the rainy-day fund should be considered. First, it should optimally be 
added to early period expenses, and it can substitute for proactive adaptation (or mitigation) only 
when proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation are substitutes. Second, the rainy-day fund is 
less adapted to auto-insure against early damages of climate change, since the balance may not be 
high enough when those occur. Third, repeated drawdowns on the fund associated with repeated 
extreme weather events may not allow the rainy-day fund to replenish. The study of the optimal 
use of a rainy-day fund in a dynamic setting at both the global and national level is an interesting 
question for future research. 
6.  Conclusion  
This paper notes that the total climate bill consists of four different components: mitigation, 
anticipative or proactive adaptation, coping or reactive adaptation, and ultimate damages. In the 
presence of climate change, a laisser-faire no action policy will result in high ultimate damages. 
These can adversely affect growth and development strategies (Lecocq and Shalizi, 2007). Policy 
actions associated with mitigation, proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation can reduce 
ultimate damages and the total climate bill—the first two being incurred before damages 
materialize and the third after climate change events occur. However, there may still be some 
ultimate damages that cannot be removed (‘remaining ultimate damages’) because they are 
technically or economically irreversible. The paper notes that adaptation policies are not limited 
to agriculture, but concern a wide range of sectors such as energy, transportation or housing. 
This paper also provides an analytic framework to address some questions raised by the 
emergence of climate change related risks, both at the global level and the national level. 
Incorporating adaptation concerns increases the relevance of this framework particularly for 
developing countries, including those that have limited opportunities for mitigation but face 
potentially significant impacts from the changing climate. However, given the increasing 
interconnections of economies worldwide, even adaptation concerns will exhibit global 
ramifications. This raises a number of important questions:  
                                                 
35 However, management becomes increasingly complex as the scope of the fund increases. For example, how do 
the resources of the rainy-day fund get allocated independently from the provenance of the funds may become 
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•  Given that the need for adaptation usually depends on the level of mitigation, what 
should be the balance between the two at the global / national level? 
•  Within the adaptation portfolio, what should be the balance between anticipative and 
reactive adaptation?  
•  How do uncertainty and budget constraints affect the results? 
The paper also briefly comments on the implications of climate-change related risks for 
modifying development strategies, and on the respective roles of private actors, governments and 
the international community (developed countries and international development agencies) in 
providing adaptation. 
The questions are addressed in a partial equilibrium model incorporating mitigation, proactive 
adaptation, reactive adaptation, and ultimate damages. The analytical resolution of the model 
confirms many standard results in economic analysis of mitigation policies—for example, that 
the marginal abatement costs should be equalized across regions and sectors, and that the 
marginal costs of abatement must be equal to the discounted some of marginal damages of 
emissions in all sectors/regions over all future periods. 
If there was no interaction between mitigation and adaptation, the optimal level of adaptation 
would not depend on the success or failure of mitigation policies at all. So observed delays in 
implementing mitigation measures would not have any consequences for adaptation 
expenditures. However, delayed mitigation will increase the need for reactive adaptation. On the 
other hand, proactive adaptation usually reduces the sensitivity of a particular region/sector to 
climate change. As a result, the optimal levels of mitigation and adaptation (both proactive and 
reactive) are jointly determined.  
Proactive and reactive adaptation in specific sectors, regions and periods should both be 
financed up to the point where the last dollar spent on adaptation is matched by exactly one dollar 
of avoided damages (in the future for proactive adaptation, vs. at the time damages are incurred 
for reactive adaptation). Proactive and reactive adaptation are also often jointly determined, 
though they may be complements or substitutes depending on the region/sector considered.  
The interdependence between mitigation and adaptation has three implications. First, it 
reinforces the importance of improving our knowledge about the costs and benefits of 
adaptation—an area currently underdeveloped relative to mitigation. Second, it suggests that 
                                                                                                                                                              
difficult to decide since countries usually want a fair (domestic) return to their investments. 
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introducing adaptation in numerical models that assess the costs and benefits of climate policies 
is very important—not as an add-on, but as a potentially important factor in shaping mitigation 
decisions.
36 Third, from a policy perspective, it suggests that mitigation policies and adaptation 
policies should be negotiated jointly, and not separately as is essentially the case today.  
Introducing uncertainty into the analysis changes some of the results. In frameworks where 
only mitigation is discussed, the only uncertainty that matters for setting the optimal level of 
mitigation is on the shape of aggregate damage function (e.g., Ambrosi et al., 2003). However 
when adaptation is introduced into the equation, an additional type of uncertainty becomes an 
issue—namely the distribution of damages across regions. Because the benefits of adaptation are 
sector- and site-specific, the benefits of preventive adaptation are likely to be more uncertain than 
the benefits of mitigation. This has implications for the optimal division of resources between 
mitigation and adaptation. Thus, when uncertainty is introduced into the model, the cost-
effectiveness of mitigation is found to increase with regard to adaptation.  
This raises two questions for developing country policy makers. First, if, in the presence of 
uncertainty, mitigation is indeed more cost-effective than adaptation, how can the need for 
collective action on mitigation be strengthened at the international negotiation level, including by 
developing country negotiators? Second, since the extent of mitigation is for the most part 
exogenous for individual country policy makers, to what extent does the optimal adaptation 
strategy depend on this exogenous parameter? This issue is of particular importance from a 
national perspective, and answering it requires a numerical estimation of the model which is not 
attempted in this paper.  
As noted earlier, the distinction between anticipative and reactive adaptation is important from 
a policy point of view because the rationale for the two actions are very different. Prevention uses 
resources now to prevent possible crisis in the future, while reactive adaptation uses resources to 
cope with events at the time they occur.
37 The crux of the problem is that, in practice, behavioral 
changes and policy decisions are often easier to implement once a crisis has occurred than in 
anticipation of a crisis. But from an economic point of view, the often lower costs of preventive 
                                                 
36 Similar exercises are already conducted when additional mitigation opportunities are taken into account. For 
example, Gitz et al. (2006) show that taken the opportunity to make plantations into account changes the magnitude 
and time-path of the optimal abatement trajectory.  
37 Creating or reinforcing in advance a coping mechanism, such as a setting up and training emergency response 
teams is anticipative adaptation, whereas using these units to reduce damages when they occur is reactive adaptation. 
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38 action (anticipative adaptation)  are likely to dominate the higher costs of deferred action 
(reactive adaptation) appropriately discounted, thereby making anticipative adaptation the 
priority for action today.  
 
The balance between anticipative and reactive adaptation is also found to be sensitive to the 
uncertainty surrounding the location of impacts. However, in contrast to the mitigation/adaptation 
balance where uncertainty favored earlier action, in this case uncertainty operates in the opposite 
direction, favoring reactive adaptation over proactive adaptation to the extent proactive 
adaptation and reactive adaptation are substitutes.
39 This is because anticipative adaptation 
measures, and particularly those that consist of building or strengthening fixed, long-lived capital 
stock, have a higher chance of being misdirected when there is uncertainty on the location of 
climate change impacts. This uncertainty is resolved once climate change events occur, hence the 
greater efficiency of reactive adaptation. In other words, with uncertainty the costs of making 
mistakes –i.e. of adapting in sectors/regions that finally will suffer less than expected –begins to 
erode the expected benefits of proactive adaptation. Mitigation, on the other hand, reduces all 
damages regardless of the region/sector, and is thus unaffected by uncertainty over the 
distribution of impacts (it, however, will remain affected by the uncertainty over the magnitude 
of impacts). 
The model, thus, allows us to rank the allocation of resources to proactive adaptation for the 
following types of climate impacts: 
1.  Where impacts will occur with high confidence in known locations, targeted (site-
specific) proactive adaptation has the highest chance of remaining cost-effective even 
if it involves producing fixed long-lived capital stock, because uncertainty on location 
and thus the risk of misdirecting investment towards the wrong region/sector is low 
(e.g., tensions on water in regions with high water stress).
40  
                                                 
38 Reactive adaptation encompasses measures under taken at the time climate change occurs that alleviate the 
ultimate damages (e.g., moving people out of harm’s way after the fact, rebuilding structures, etc.) however, lump 
sum transfers of resources to victims of climate change are not included in reactive adaptation because as transfers 
they do not affect this size or efficiency of the economy. 
39 But not if they are complements. 
40 McCallaway (2004) makes a similar point that irreversible investment for adaptation will be undertaken when it 
becomes clear that the climatic events they are aimed at adapting to are not random events, but part of climate 
change.  
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2.  Where impacts will occur with high confidence within a country, but whose location 
within the country remains uncertain, non-targeted (i.e. non-site-specific) anticipative 
adaptation may still remain cost-effective if they cover enough sectors/regions (e.g., 
developing country-wide insurance markets, or setting up programs to diversify 
smallholder revenue sources). 
3.  Where impacts will occur with low confidence and whose location is uncertain, 
reactive adaptation is more likely to be the cost-effective relative to proactive 
adaptation. 
Thus, going from category 1 to category 3 reactive policies look better relative to preventive 
policies, especially when abatement decisions by other countries are exogenous. 
Relying on reactive adaptation, however, assumes that there are public resources available for 
paying for the reactive adaptation measures and for paying for the remaining damages at the time 
events occur. In fact, public resources are rarely stable over long periods of time, especially in 
developing countries. The probability that the impacts of climate change will also coincide with 
low public resources is all the more important given that the two risks are at least partly 
correlated. Reactive adaptation may require large expenditures in a short period of time, whereas 
proactive adaptation expenditures, if properly planned, can more easily be spread out over time. 
Thus, reactive adaptation may be more difficult to achieve if budget constraints become 
tighter. In this context, setting up rainy-day funds—a fourth policy variable alongside mitigation, 
proactive adaptation and reactive adaptation
41—appears to be an attractive solution. Such funds 
could still be cost-effective even with low returns, so long as the risk of not being able to react 
adequately is high because of budget constraints. At the global level, the rainy-day fund is a form 
of self-insurance whose usefulness will be highest when contributions cumulate in the medium-
term. At the national level, resources might be lower and financing of reactive adaptation may 
have to be split between a national rainy-day fund and transfers from the global level.  
However, even when there is uncertainty on location of damages, the rainy-day fund may 
complement, but not necessarily replace, proactive adaptation. More research using models 
where investing in the fund is explicitly incorporated as a fourth policy variable is required to 
fully determine the conditions under which rainy-day funds are effective, notably taking into 
account that the date at which damages occur is uncertain, and that anticipative adaptation 
                                                 
41 Though investing in a rainy-day fund is a special form of proactive adaptation. 
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typically reduces damages during more than one period. In fact, if rainy-day funds cannot be 
designed or administered properly then targeted proactive adaptation may still be preferable 
despite some misallocation of resources. Empirical research on the returns to these funds in 
developing country contexts is also necessary. 
 
In addition, a qualitative analysis suggests that even though the benefits of adaptation are 
mostly private or local public goods, there are multiple instances in which public intervention 
with regard to adaptation is required. This intervention can take the form of providing resources 
for adaptation directly, but more often than not it consists in setting up regulatory frameworks 
and creating adequate sets of incentives for private actors. Providing information and analyzing 
the vulnerability of all assets exhibiting public goods characteristics are identified as two other 
priority areas.  
A similar reasoning suggests that there are multiple instances in which the international 
community may support adaptation at the country level on top of what individual countries are 
doing. Further empirical work is required to determine how much adaptation is required, how 
much private agents, developing country governments and the international community can 
afford, and whether the existing framework and level of international funds for adaptation is 
capable of meeting the needs. 
Finally, with regard to the issue of modifying development strategies, the qualitative 
discussion in Section 2 concludes that reviewing development strategies in light of the emerging 
climate related risks is a necessary step for all actors, public and private. It is suggested that 
taking climate considerations into account is likely to lead to significant departures from current 
development strategies, if only because new infrastructure and long-lived institutions have to be 
redesigned to withstand higher climate-related risks. The model developed in Sections 3-5 
provide some insights on optimal resource allocation for tackling the climate risk, but the partial 
equilibrium framework adopted does not provide specific guidance as to how and where 
development goals might have to be altered given the resources freed for climate change. To 
answer that question, a general equilibrium framework and country-specific studies are required. 
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Appendix 1: Derivation of the optimal conditions for model with uncertainty and with 
budget constraints 
We solve the model (6)-(11) with budget constraints (20) and (21). The Lagrangean L of the 
problem is as follows: 
() ( ) () ( ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ⎢
⎣
⎡














P A C B p R P P A A D R P A C p L π ρ ρ , ,..., , , , 1 1 1 1 K ( )
            ( A 1 )  
with 






− − − ∑
∈ k C ij
ijts ijts ijts ijt kts kts R P A C B π
        ( A 2 )  





ρ To shorten the expression of L, the discount factor has been written  . 
First order conditions are obtained by deriving L with regard to each policy variable for any 
period t < τ 
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In equation (A5), k(i,j) denotes the country to which the sector/region (i,j) belongs. Equation 
(A5) simplifies in (12) when there are no budget constraint, and in (3) when there is no 
uncertainty. Equations (23), and then (13) and (4), and (24), and then (14) and (5) are derived the 
same way. 
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Appendix 2: Derivation of equation (26) 
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Since the average annual rate of returns of the rainy-day fund ρ is normally distributed with 
mean  ρ  and variance σρ
2, ρ(t'-t)+π is normally distributed with mean  π ρ + − ) ' ( t t  and variance 
(t'-t)² σρ
2, and 
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As a result, the marginal condition in which one additional dollar in the rainy-day fund is cost-
effective can be rewritten as follows:  
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